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WHOSE FEDERALISM? 
S. ELIZABETH WILBORN MALLOY· 
INTRODUCTION 
In his Article, Sounds ojSovereignty, Professor John Yoo makes a persuasive 
argument based on recent jurisprudence that the Supreme Court is once again 
reviewing federal legislation for federalism concerns. l Professor Yoo applauds 
this trend, which he believes will lead to greater protection for individual liberty 
and state autonomy, and contends that the Court should continue to review 
congressional statutes for compliance with federalism mandates. 
Though he favors the renewed emphasis that the Supreme Court has placed 
on protecting state autonomy, Professor Yoo concedes that there could be a flaw 
in the Court's jurisprudence-specifically, its failure to define coherently a 
comprehensive yet viable federalism theory. He is correct to recognize the need 
for a complete theory. The Court's failure to develop a workable federalism 
theory was a principle reason the Court for many years stopped reviewing 
legislation for federalism concerns.2 In the absence of established guidelines for 
reviewing legislation, the Court was and will be vulnerable to the charge that it 
makes decisions based on the desired political outcome. Relying on his extensive 
study of the writings of the early federalists, Professor Y 00 argues that the 
Court's theory should be based on an underlying value, the protection of 
individual liberty. This presumes that the Court's new approach actually 
supports this underlying concern. Unfortunately, the current federalism cases 
appear to undermine individual liberty, and thus Professor Yoo's argument as 
well.3 
• Assistant Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. B.A., College of William 
and Mary; J.D., Duke University. Many thanks to the Indiana Law Review and the Program on 
Law and State Government for inviting me to participate in their symposium. In addition, my 
sincere thanks to Professor Michael Solimine for his insight into federalism issues. 
1. John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REV. 
27 (1998) [hereinafter Sounds of Sovereignty]; see also John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of 
Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1311 (1997) [hereinafter Judicial Safeguards]. 
2. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-551 (1985) 
(discussing lack offederalism theory under, and overruling, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 
U.S. 833 (1976)). See also Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: 
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1988) (asserting Supreme Court's 
recent failure in protecting state sovereignty stems from inconsistent rulings); William W. Van 
Alstyne, Comment, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1709, 1713, 1732-33 
(1985) (recognizing Supreme Court's long period of refusal to strike down acts of Congress on pure 
federalism grounds). 
3. Sounds of Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 28,34-38,42-44. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452, 467 (1991), the Court held that Missouri state court judges were "appointees on the 
policymaking level," and, thus, were excluded from the Age Discrimination Employment Act 
("ADEA"). Before reaching this conclusion, the Court described its view on the role of the states 
in the federal system. The Court, speaking through Justice O'Connor, declared that the "principal 
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I agree with much of Professor Yoo's argument. The Garde! Court's 
complete abandonment offederalism concerns left little protection for the states 
against an increasing number offederallegislative mandates.s It is right that the 
Court should develop a comprehensive federalism theory when determining 
whether federal legislation is applicable to the states. 
I disagree, however, with Professor Yoo's contention that support for 
individual liberty is the basis for or supported by the current federalism 
jurisprudence. As a result of the Court's new federalism, state governments have 
a strong argument that many civil rights laws no longer apply to them~ Those 
individuals who benefit from these laws, e.g., the aged,' the disabled,8 and hourly 
wage earners9 have actually seen individual liberty suffer under the new 
benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of government power." Id. at 458. For this 
system to be effective, "there must be a proper balance between the States and the Federal 
Government." Id. at 459. The employee, like that in Gregory, challenging a state's decision to 
terminate her employment because of her age, faces this Court's conviction about federalism. See 
also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (O'Connor, 1., concurring) (stating 
that "the more challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding [a class of 
persons'] liberty interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the States in the first instance.") 
(citation omitted). 
4. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
5. See generally Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Federalism, Liberty and State 
Constitutional Law, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1457 (1997) (reviewing the rise of state constitutional 
law and its impact on individual liberty enhan.cement and federalism). 
6. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), 
read the Court's decisions as preventing "Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad 
range of actions against States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those 
concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation of our vast national economy." Id. 
at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He pointed out that in areas of exclusive federal 
jurisdiction---copyright, bankruptcy and antitrust-affording the states Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from fedeml court liability effectively leaves persons injured by state violations without 
ajudicial remedy. Jd. at 77 n.l. 
7. See Humenansky v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars ADEA suits filed in fedeml court against state entities); 
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 FJd 1426 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that states are immune 
from suit under the ADEA because of the Eleventh Amendment); but see Keeton v. University of 
Nev. Sys., 150 FJd 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that "Congress abrogated the states' 
immunity in amending the ADEA pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority"); 
Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees, 141 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the ADEA abrogates 
state's immunity from suit); Hurd v. Pittsburgh State Univ., 109 F.3d 1540 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that the state's immunity from suit was abrogated under the ADEA). 
8. See Garrett v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala., 989 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ala. 
1998); Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, 987 F. Supp. 451 (E.D.N.C. 1997); 
Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
9. See Mills v. Maine, 118 FJd 37, 48 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that the Fair Labor 
Standards Act does not apply against the states); Larry v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala .. 
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federalism. The Court appears to have forgotten that the federal government can 
play an important role in safeguarding liberty by helping prevent discrimination. 
These laws must necessarily be valid against state governments in order to 
provide equivalent protection of basic rights for all citizens. The new federalism 
decisions limit Congress' ability to deter discrimination by state or local 
government. 
To highlight the harmful effects of the new jurisprudence, this Article 
examines some of the recent state challenges to the applicability of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA,,).IO Some state governments have 
already successfully challenged the applicability of the ADA to state entities. II 
Although the ADA's application to private actors is not in doubt,12 lower courts 
have begun to split over whether it can be enforced against states.13 States have 
argued that they are immune from the ADA's nondiscrimination and 
accommodation requirements because Congress did not have the power to 
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. 
Congress' power to override state Eleventh Amendment immunity has been 
seriously limited by two of the recent Supreme Court federalism decisions: 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida l4 and City of Boerne v. Flores .IS Although 
975 F. Supp. 1447, 1450 (N.D. Ala 1997) (holding that the Equal Pay Act does not apply against 
the states); but see Varner v. Illinois State Univ., 150 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
Congress acted within its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it 
abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits under the Equal Pay Act); Timmer v. 
Michigan Dep't of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that congress validly 
abrogated state's immunity from suit under the Equal Pay Act). 
10. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328 (1990) (codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (1994 & Supp. I 1995 & Supp. II 1996». 
11. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
12. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (holding Title III valid under the 
Commerce Clause as applied to a dentist); United States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157, 1168 (E.D. 
La. 1995) (enjoining defendant dentist from refusing treatment on basis of HI V status); Pinnock 
v. International House of Pancakes Franchisee, 844 F. Supp. 574, 579 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (holding 
that Title III of the ADA, which regulates public accommodations, is a proper exercise of the 
Commerce Clause power as applied to a restaurant). 
13. See Garrett, 989 F. Supp. at 1410 (agreeing with the court in Nihiser); Brown, 987 F. 
Supp. at 457-59 (holding that the ADA as a whole is not valid under the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Nihiser, 979 F. Supp. at 1176 (holding that the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement is 
not valid under the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Autio v. AFSCME, Local 3139, 140 F.3d 802 
(8th Cir. 1998) (holding enactment of the ADA was attempt by Congress to enforce Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection, and is clearly adapted to that end); Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 
1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the ADA is valid under the Fourteenth Amendment), cert. 
denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998); Martin v. Kansas, 978 F. Supp. 992, 996 (D. Kan. 1997) 
(concluding Congress validly exercised its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment 
in abrogating states' immunity under ADA). 
14. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
15. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). 
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these two cases deal with the power of the federal courts to enforce federal law 
against state government, they also concern the power of individuals to vindicate 
federally-mandated rights in federal court. Though they may ease states' 
burdens, these decisions also constrict the individuals' ability to go to federal 
court to protect themselves under federal law against state discrimination. 
This Article examines briefly the Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne 
decisions. Part II then focuses on the ADA and the reasons why Congress made 
it applicable to government conduct as well as private conduct. Finally, Part III 
examines the argument, based on the new federalism, that the ADA should not 
apply to state entities. It does not appear that the Court's new federalism has had 
a liberty-enhancing effect for some of the most vulnerable persons in our society. 
The Court's revitalized federalism jurisprudence has led to questions about the 
continuing validity of many of our civil rights statutes as applied against the 
states. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW NEW FEDERALISM-LIMITING CONGRESS' 
POWER TO ABROGATE STATE IMMUNITY 
In light of recent Supreme Court decisions, the Eleventh Amendment may 
now be a barrier to ADA suits brought against state governments. The 
Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another Sate, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.,,16 Although a literal reading of the Amendment 
would not appear to bar a citizen from bringing suit against his state in federal 
court,17 the Supreme Court has long held the Amendment indeed prohibits such 
suits. 18 By granting state immunity from suit in federal court, the Eleventh 
Amendment limits the ability of Congress to regulate state conduct. 
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment does not 
entirely bar the litigation of discrimination claims against the states in federal 
courts. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits in federal court against 
individuals who are state officials, although the extent of this limitation depends 
to some degree on whether the individuals are sued in their "personal" or 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
17. The Amendment refers only to citizens of other states and foreign citizens. U.S. CON ST. 
amend. XI. 
18. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I, 21 (1890). Similarly, although the Eleventh 
Amendment refers only to suits in law and equity, the Court has also held that the Amendment bars 
suits in admiralty. See New York Pet. of Walsh, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (barring in personam 
suit in admiralty); New York Pet. of The Queen City, 256 U.S. 503, 510 (1921) (barring in rem suit 
against vessel owned by the state). 
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"official" capacities. '9 "Since Ex parte Young, (20) ... it has been settled that the 
Eleventh Amendment provides no shield for a state official confronted by a claim 
that he had deprived another of a federal right under the color of state law.,,21 
Also, the Eleventh Amendment only bars retrospective relief, not prospective 
injunctive relief.22 
Because the Eleventh Amendment aims to preserve the sovereign immunity 
of the states, it is no broader than the sovereign immunity asserted by a state. To 
the extent that a state has waived its immunity, the state is subject to suit in 
federal court.23 
Of most significance in the context of the ADA, Congress has historically 
had the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity by a sufficiently clear 
legislative statement,24 when it acted within power conferred by the U.S. 
19. See Hafer v. Mel0, 502 U.S. 21, 29 (1991) (explaining relationship between 42 U.S.c. 
§ 1983 (Supp. II 1996) and Eleventh Amendment; liability of public officials sued in their personal 
capacities under section 1983 and Eleventh Amendment is not limited to acts outside their authority 
or not essential to state government but also extends to official acts). 
20. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
21. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 30 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974), overruled 
on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984». The application of the Amendment 
is guided by its purpose, which is to prevent "private parties seeking to impose a liability which 
must be paid from public funds in the state treasury." /d. (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 
651,663 (1974». 
22. See Clemes v. Del Norte County Unified Sch. Dist., 843 F. Supp. 583, 594 (N.D. Cal. 
I 994). 
23. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775,778-82 (1991) (reviewing 
relationship between Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity); see also Clark v. California, 
123 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that state waives Eleventh Amendment immunity by 
accepting federal funds where the funding statute manifests a clear intent to waive constitutional 
immunity), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998). Cf Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, 979 
F. Supp. 1168, 1169 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (finding mere fact that state participates in program through 
which United States government provides funding to state is not sufficient to establish state's 
consent to suit). 
24. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985) (refusing even to 
consider evidence from the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act suggesting that Congress 
intended that statute to constitute an exercise of its Section 5 abrogation power, and stating that 
"Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court 
only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."). The year 
following the Court's decision in Atascadero, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act Amendments 
of 1986, expressly indicating its intent to subject the states to suit under the Rehabilitation Act as 
well as "any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial 
assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(I) (1994). For commentary critical of the clear statement rule, 
see, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, QuaSi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 621-23, 629-45 (1992) 
(criticizing clear statement rules in general, and also noting that the Court "played a kind of 'bait 
and switch' trick on Congress" by applying Atascadero's clear statement rule even to older federal 
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Constitution.25 The abrogation power is strongest when Congress legislates 
under the power given it by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 In 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas CO.,27 the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, held 
that Congress also has the authority under the Commerce Clause to abrogate 
Eleventh Amendment immunity?8 It is this holding that the Court reversed in 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.29 
statutes); Vicki C. Jackson, One Hundred Years o/Folly: The Eleventh Amendment and the 1988 
Term, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 51, 77-91 (1990). But cf George D. Brown, State Sovereignty Under the 
Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment Survived the Death o/the Tenth: Some Broader 
Implications 0/ Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 GEO. L.1. 363, 388 (1985) (defending the 
clear statement rule because it "ensures that Congress knew what it was doing" in the abrogation 
context, and, in the case of implied waiver, "provides the additional assurance that the state knows 
what it is getting into"); Michael E. Solimine, Rethinking Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 52 U. 
PITT. L. REv. 383, 401-19 (1991) (defending the clear statement rule on a number of grounds). 
25. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 788 (rejecting argument that 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994) did 
not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for suits by Indian tribes). The Supreme Court first 
recognized Congress' power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment protection without their 
consent in its 1976 decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). In that case, a sex 
discrimination suit brought by state employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. the 
Court unanimously held that "the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty 
which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment" and that Congress therefore has the power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when 
acting pursuant to Section 5. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (citations omitted). The Court reasoned 
that the Fourteenth Amendment, enacted as part of the wholesale restructuring following the Civil 
War, contemplated a "shift in the federal-state balance" and thus "sanctioned intrusions by 
Congress ... into the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved 
to the States"-including the authorization of suits that would be "constitutionally impermissible 
in other contexts." Id. at 455-56. The Court explained: 
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that 
is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority 
under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own 
terms embody limitations on state authority. We think that Congress may, in 
determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing the provisions 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials. 
Id. at 456 (citations omitted). 
26. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456. Congress has the power to enforce the provisions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment "by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
27. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
28. Id. at 13-14. 
29. 517 U.S. 44, 63-64, 66 (1996). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the 
power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States"); see also 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. I, 14-15 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled by 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). In Seminole Tribe, the Court overturned the 
seven-year-old ruling in Union Gas, holding this time that Congress does not have the power to 
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when acting under Article I. Noting that "we 
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In Seminole Tribe,30 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five-to-four 
majority,31 held that Congress could not abrogate state immunity under any of its 
Article I powers, including the Indian Commerce Clause and the Commerce 
Clause.32 Specifically, the Court struck down a provision in the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act ("IGRA"t3 that authorized Native American tribes to bring suit 
in federal court against states that failed to negotiate in good faith with tribes 
seeking to enter into compacts governing the operation of certain gambling 
activities.34 
always have treated stare decisis as a 'principle of policy,' and not as an 'inexorable command,'" 
the Seminole Tribe majority dismissed Union Gas as a "deeply fractured decision" and "a solitary 
departure from established law." Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 63-64,66 (citations 
omitted). Specifically, the Court held that '''the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional 
limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III'" that is "not so ephemeral as to 
dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area ... that is under the exclusive control of the Federal 
Government." Id. at 68,72 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 
(1984». 
30. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Seminole Tribe involved 
legislation passed pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The 
Seminole Tribe filed suit against the states of Florida and Alabama to compel negotiations under 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, II F.3d 1016, 1018 
(11th Cir. 1994). The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied that state's 
motion to dismiss, while the District Court for the Southern District of Alabama granted the motion 
to dismiss. Id. The Court of Appeals held that Congress could not abrogate the states' sovereign 
immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause, distinguishing Congress' power under the Indian 
Commerce Clause from the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1028. 
31. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court, which was joined by Justices 
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Justice Souter filed a lengthy dissenting opinion in which 
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 100 (Souter, J., Ginsburg, Breyer, 
11., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 76 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
32. Id. at 72-73. The Court also dismissed the portion of the Tribe's suit naming the 
Governor as a defendant. Id. at 76. Although the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar a suit against a state official seeking prospective injunctive relief, see 
supra notes 23-25 and accompanying te.xt, the Court explained that "where Congress has prescribed 
a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court 
should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer 
based upon Ex parte Young." Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74. Given the statute's repeated 
references to "the State," the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to create a cause of 
action against individual state officials. Id. at 75 n.17. This portion of the Seminole Tribe decision 
has received mixed reviews. Compare David P. Currie, Ex Parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 547 (1997) (defending the Court's position), with Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole 
Tribe. The Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N. Y. U. L. 
REv. 495, 510-41 (1997) (criticizing the Court). 
33. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994). 
34. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
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To determine if federal legislation abrogated a state's sovereign immunity, 
the Seminole Tribe opinion required two determinations: "first, whether 
Congress has 'unequivocally expresse[d] its intentto abrogate the immunity,' and 
second, whether Congress has acted 'pursuant to a valid exercise of power. ",35 
The Court answered the first inquiry in the affirmative. The Court observed that 
the IGRA's statutory language indicated a clear congressional intent to abrogate 
the Eleventh Amendment, thereby satisfying the clear statement rule?6 However, 
the Court concluded that Congress lacked the power to abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment when legislating under its Article I powers?' 
Given the centrality of the Commerce Clause to Congress' expansive 
legislative reach,38 the Seminole Tribe precedent seriously curtailed federal 
legislative authority?9 After Seminole Tribe, the Fourteenth Amendment Section 
5 enforcement power stands as the sole recognized source of congressional 
authority to abrogate state immunity.40 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that no state may 
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.,,41 
35. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985». 
36. Id. at 56. 
37. Seminole. Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73. 
38. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (explaining that the Commerce 
Clause gives Congress the power to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, people, and articles moving in interstate commerce, and activities affecting commerce); 
Vincent A. Cirillo & Jay W. Eisenhofer, Reflections on the Congressional Commerce Power, 60 
TEMP. L. Q. 901, 912 (1987) (describing the expansion of Congress' power under the Commerce 
Clause). But see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (explaining that Congress 
cannot regulate intrastate activities under the Commerce Clause unless they "substantially affect" 
interstate commerce). 
39. For a discussion of the dramatic impact that Seminole Tribe has had on the enforcement 
ofthe ADEA in federal courts against the states, see Edward P. Noonan, The ADEA in the Wake 
of Seminole, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 879 (1997). 
40. In fact, the Seminole Tribe Court distinguished the Fourteenth Amendment on three 
grounds: it was adopted "well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment," its prohibitions are 
"expressly directed at the States," and it "fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal 
power struck by the Constitution." Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59, 65. See also Nihiser v. Ohio 
Envtl. Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 (S.D. Ohio 1997) ("[T]he only currently 
recognized authority for Congress to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity ... consists of 
Congress' enactment of legislation pursuant to its enforcement powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment."). But see Diaz-Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 616 n.9 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(holding that Congress has the power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when acting under its 
war powers, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cIs. 1, 11-16, concluding, without explanation, that Seminole 
Tribe "does not control the War Powers analysis."). 
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
to abolish the official practice of racial discrimination. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 
192 (1964). The Equal Protection Clause "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly 
situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 
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Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress with explicit 
authority to enforce the guarantees of that amendment and to enact legislation 
specifically addressing conduct that violates the Equal Protection Clause.42 Prior 
to City of Boerne v. Flores,43 the Supreme Court had been divided over the scope 
of Congress' Section 5 enforcement power.44 In Katzenbach v. Morgan,45 Justice 
Brennan, writing for the majority, interpreted Section 5 to authorize Congress to 
provide protection for substantive rights that the Fourteenth Amendment, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, did not require.46 The Court held that Section 
4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,47 which invalidated English literacy 
requirements, was a valid exercise of Section 5.48 The Court upheld the Act 
despite its earlier holding in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of 
Elections,49 that such literacy tests did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.50 
The Morgan Court explained that it was upholding Congress' power to define a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause because Section 5 is a "positive grant of 
legislative power" that allows Congress to determine independently what 
legislative action is necessary to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.51 This 
approach has been called the "ratchet" theory because it perm its Congress to 
increase, but not decrease, the Fourteenth Amendment's protections.52 The 
Morgan Court reasoned, 
It was for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to assess and 
(1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982». In other words, the clause limits the ability 
of legislatures to classifY individuals into groups for the purposes of subjecting them to dissimilar 
treatment under the law. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2, at 
1439 n.22 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that legislative classifications are the focus of equal protection); 
Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. 
REv. I (1955); John E. Nowak, Federalism and the Civil War Amendments, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
1209 (1997). 
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
43. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). 
44 .. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 
(1966). 
45. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
46. Id. at 653-56. 
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1 973gg-8 (1994). 
48. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 643. 
49. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
50. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649. 
51. Id. at 651. See Jesse H. Choper, Congressional Power to Expand Judicial DefinitiOns 
of the Substantive Terms of the Civil Warm Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REv. 299, 302 (1982). 
52. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.1O (explaining that Congress may act only to enforce, not 
"restrict, abrogate or dilute" the Fourteenth Amendment). See also Robert E. Rains, A Pre-History 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Some Initial Thoughts as to Its Constitutional 
Implications, II ST. LOUIS U. Pus. L. REV. 185, 202 (1992) (explaining the ratchet theory as 
applied to the ADA). 
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weigh the various conflicting considerations-the risk or pervasiveness 
of the discrimination in governmental services, the effectiveness of 
eliminating the state restriction on the right to vote as a means of dealing 
with the evil, the adequacy or availability of alternative remedies, and 
the nature and significance of the state interests that would be affected 
.. " It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of these 
factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the 
Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.53 
Although the "ratchet" theory had been criticized in subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions, it had not been expressly rejected by a majority ofthe Court.54 
In City of Boerne v. Flores,55 the Court clearly indicated that Congress could not 
alter the substantive protections ofthe Fourteenth Amendment.56 City of Boerne 
addressed the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
("RFRA"),S7 which directed courts to apply a strict scrutiny standard to laws that 
substantially burden an individual's exercise of religion.s8 Congress enacted 
RFRA in response to the Supreme Court.'s holding in Employment Division v. 
53. Morgan. 384 U.S. at 653. 
54. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 261-62 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the ADEA was invalid under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because the Court had 
expressly ruled that age is not a suspect class and thus, Congress could not override state laws that 
satisfy the rational basis test as age discriminatory); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 296 (1970) 
(Stewart, 1., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Voting Rights Act provision 
that lowered the voting age in national and state elections to 18 would be "valid only if Congress 
has the power not only to provide the means of eradicating ... a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause, but also to determine as a matter of substantive constitutional law what situations fall within 
the ambit of the clause"). 
55. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). The City of Boerne case arose when St. Peter Church outgrew 
its facility, a 1920s imitation Spanish mission style structure in the City of Boerne, Texas. Id. at 
2160. Although the church itself is not a historic landmark, the front facade is located within a 
historic district. The city refused to approve any plan of expansion that would require demolition 
of any part of the church building, whether inside or outside the historic district. Raising claims 
under both RFRA and the First Amendment, the Archbishop of San Antonio sued the city on behalf 
of the church. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1354 (5th Cir. 1996). 
56. City of Boerne, 177 S. Ct. at 2167. ("Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive, 
non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law."). The 
court emphasized this point later at the end of its opinion: 
When the political branches of the Government act against the background of a 
judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood 
that in later case and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the 
respect due them under settled principles ... and contrary expectations must be 
disappointed. 
Id. at 2172. 
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994). 
58. Id. § 2000bb-1. 
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Smith,'9 which upheld a state law criminalizing the use of peyote for any purpose, 
including religious ceremonies.60 In Smith, the Court held that absent any intent 
to discriminate on the basis of religion, state laws of general applicability are 
valid even when they interfere with religious practices.61 
In City of Boerne, with a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the 
Supreme Court held RFRA was beyond Congress' power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.62 Based on the Court's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
history ,63 the Court put to rest Morgan's implication that Congress had the power 
to expand the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.64 Instead, the 
Court explained, the enforcement power is remedial, and therefore must be 
limited to preventing or alleviating actual constitutional violations.6s To prevent 
Congress from using this power to enact general legislation unrelated to 
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court announced that "[t]here 
must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or 
remedied and the means adopted to that end.'>6Ii In so doing, the Court recognized 
that there is no clear categorical difference between legislation that prevents 
Fourteenth Amendment violations and legislation that creates new rights not 
found in the Constitution.67 City of Boerne imposes a balancing test that requires 
a comparison of two factors: the extent of the constitutional injury a law is 
meant to address and the level of intrusion that the law imposes on states.68 
59. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
60. Id. at 878-79. 
61. Id. 
62. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997). 
63. Id. at 2164-66 (noting that an earlier draft of the Fourteenth Amendment encountered 
broad opposition because it granted too much power to Congress). 
64. Id. at 2168. 
65. Id. at 2164. 
66. Id. Such a relationship is needed, the Court said, because "the line between measures 
that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the 
governing law is not easy to discern." Id. 
67. The Court reaffirmed the proposition, however, that "[I]egislation which deters or 
remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even 
if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional." Id. at 2163. Although 
Congress' legislative reach under the Fourteenth Amendment is thus somewhat broader than the 
Amendment itself, the Supreme Court has not expressly held that Congress' power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment extends to regUlating private conduct. See Jack M. Beermann, The 
Supreme Court's Narrow View on Civil Rights, 1993 SUP. CT. REv. 199,210 & n.46 (discussing 
Congress' expansive Fourteenth Amendment power). The Fourteenth Amendment itself only 
applies to state action. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, II (1883). In the Civil Rights 
Cases, the Court held that Congress cannot reach private conduct when enacting laws pursuant to 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
68. City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170. Under City of Boerne, therefore, the reach of the 
enforcement power depends on the prevalence of constitutional violations. The Court explained: 
"The appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented .... 
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Noting that the congressional record contained little mention of state laws 
enacted for the purpose of discriminating on religious grounds and few instances 
of purposeful religious discrimination, the Court concluded that RFRA bore little 
relation to any constitutional injury.69 The Court concluded that Congress was 
not primarily concerned about intentional discrimination when it enacted 
RFRA.70 Instead, the Court determined that Congress' principal desire was to 
alleviate the incidental burdens on religious practice that otherwise valid laws 
may impose.71 Lacking a connection to a constitutional injury, the Court 
concluded that the right created by RFRA, to be free from the application of 
burdensome state laws, was a new right not found in the Constitution.72 After 
City of Boerne, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment apparently only 
authorizes Congress to provide remedies for judicially-determined constitutional 
violations. In addition, in preparing legislation to remedy Fourteenth 
Amendment violations, Congress must make fairly detailed findings in the 
legislative record of unconstitutional behavior to satisfy the new City of Boerne 
congruence and proportionality standard.73 
II. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
When Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act'4 in 1990, it 
Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser 
one," and "[p]reventative measures ... may be appropriate when there is reason to believe that 
many of the laws affected by the congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being 
unconstitutional." Id. at 2169-70. 
69. Id. 
70. /d. at 2169. In holding the RFRA congressional record inadequate, the Court 
distinguished the earlier Voting Rights cases, "[i]n contrast to the record which confronted 
Congress and the judiciary in the Voting Rights cases, RFRA's legislative record lacks examples 
of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry." Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 2170. 
73. Id. at 2164 (requiring "a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be 
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end"). 
74. Pub. L. No. 101-336. 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified primarily at 42 U.S.c. §§ 
12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. 11995 & Supp. II 1996». Congress set forth its findings in the text 
of the statute that: 
individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, 
including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, 
transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to 
make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification 
standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, 
benefits, jobs, or other opportunities. 
42 U.S.c. § 1210I(a)(5) (1994). For an excellent overview of the ADA, see LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, 
DISABILITIES AND THE LAW §§ 1.05, 4.06 (2d ed. 1997). 
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noted that there were 43 million Americans with physical or mental disabilities.75 
After fourteen hearings held by the Congress on the ADA, and as a result of the 
sixty-three field hearings and the hundreds of discrimination diaries submitted 
for the legislative record by persons with disabilities,76 Congress found that these 
disabled persons suffered severe prejudice and discrimination.77 In addition, 
Congress observed that people who suffered discrimination because of a 
disability often had no legal remedies,78 unlike members of other constitutionally 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(I) (1994). 
76. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Senate Comm. 
on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Congo 253-54 
(1989) (testimony of Justin Dart, Chairperson of the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment 
of Americans with Disabilities). 
77. The Senate report resulting from hearings on the ADA, see supra note 77 and 
accompanying text, acknowledged that 
[o]ur society is still infected by the ancient, now almost subconscious assumption 
that people with disabilities are less than fully human and therefore are not fully 
eligible for the opportunities, services, and support systems which are available to 
other people as a matter of right. The result is massive, society-wide 
discrimination. 
S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 8-9 (1989) (referring to previous testimony by Justin Dart, Chairperson of 
the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities). For persons with 
mental disabilities in particular, the extensive history of discrimination is even more disturbing. 
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 461- 64 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (summarizing history of purposeful discrimination against 
individuals with mental disabilities); ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALL y ILL IN AMERICA 353 (2d 
ed. 1949) (noting that at the tum of the century "the feebleminded person was looked upon as a 
parasite on the body politic who must be mercilessly isolated or destroyed for the protection of 
society"). See generally Timothy M. Cook, The Americans With Disabilities Act: The Move to 
Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 393, 399-414 (1991) (discussing the historical segregation, isolation, 
and degradation of the disabled in this country). 
78. Prior to enactment of the ADA, the rights of persons with disabilities were protected 
incompletely. See Dick Thornburgh, The Americans with Disabilities Act: What It Means to All 
Americans, 64 TEMPLE L. REv. 375, 377 (1991) ("The ADA overcomes our past failure to eliminate 
attitudinal, architectural, and communication barriers in employment, transportation, public 
accommodations, public services, and telecommunications."). For example, the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 only provided disabled persons with protection against discrimination by federally funded 
entities, and was not enforceable against state or local governments or private entities that did not 
receive federal funds. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 390 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 USC § 
790 (1994), repealed by Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 Stat. 4424 (1992), and 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 
(1994 & Supp. II 1996), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-220, 112 Stat. 936 (\ 998}). Thus, persons 
with disabilities had no protection from discrimination in many areas, including state and local 
activities and services. See Thornburgh, supra at 377 n.9 (Title V of the Rehabilitation Act 
expressly applies only to recipients of federal funds, federal employers, and federal contractors); 
see also Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans With Disabilities 
Act, 64 TEMPLEL. REv. 471, 475-76 (1991). 
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or statutorily protected groups.79 Congress also learned that the discrimination 
disabled persons suffered was many times intentional, and implemented through 
official state action that legislatively deemed persons with disabilities "unfit for 
citizenship. "so 
Based on this data, Congress set forth detailed legislative findings in the 
ADA, asserting that disabled individuals are a "discrete and insular minority who 
have been ... subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment ... based 
on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals."sl To eradicate 
this discrimination, Congress "invoke[d] the sweep of congressional authority, 
including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate 
79. 42 U.S.C. § 12101{a){4) (1994). 
80. Cook, supra note 77, at 400 (citing 1920 Miss. Laws 294,ch. 210, § 17) (noting that 
chancery courts have jurisdiction in cases of legal inquiry in regard to feeble-m\ndedness which 
renders persons unfit for citizenship). Many states had laws that officially required the segregation 
of persons with disabilities, allegedly for the benefit of society, and "to relieve society of 'the heavy 
economic and moral losses arising from the existence at large of these unfortunate persons. '" City 
of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 462-63 n.9 (Marshall, 1., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting Act of March 22,1915, ch. 90,1915 Tex. Gen. Laws 143, (repealed 1955». See also 
1919 Fla. Laws 231, 234, ch. 7887, § 8 (purpose of Florida Farm Colony is segregation of 
feeble-minded); 1919 Ga. Laws 377, 379, No. 373, § 3 (segregation permitted "for his own 
protection or the protection of others"); 1918 Ky. Acts 156, ch. 54; id. at 171, § 30 (provision for 
segregation and custody offeeble-minded, epileptic, and insane persons); 1921 Neb. Laws 843, ch. 
241, § I para. 7221 (object of state institution for feeble-minded is "to segregate them from 
society"); 1905 N.H. Laws 413, ch. 23, § 1 (provision for detention of feeble-minded females over 
age 21, if in best interest of community); 1917 N.H. Laws 645, ch. 141, § I (provision for detention 
of feeble-minded females over age 21; if in best interest of community); 1911 Pa. Laws 927, 
preamble & § I (commission established to investigate plan for segregation, care, and treatment of 
feeble-minded); 1913 Pa. Laws 494-95, No. 328, § I (state institution devoted to segregation and 
care of epileptics and feeble-minded); 1921 S.D. Sess. Laws 344, ch. 235, §§ 1-3 (state commission 
granted power to make regulations for care and segregation of feeble-minded); 1914 Va. Acts 242, 
ch. 147, § I (state board to'develop scheme for training and segregation offeeble-minded); 1916 
Va. Acts 662, ch. 388 (purpose of act to define feeble-mindedness and provide for care and 
segregation of feeble-minded in institutions); 1909 Wash. Laws 260, tit. II. ch. 6, § 2 (idiotic 
children to be segregated in suitable accommodations). 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994). Based on this statutory language, some courts and 
commentators have argued that the ADA overruled Cleburne. See Martin v. Voinovich, 840 F. 
Supp. 1175, 1209 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (finding that the ADA overruled Cleburne); Rains. supra note 
53, at 201 (arguing that the ADA is intended to mandate heightened scrutiny); James B. Miller, 
Note and Comment, The Disabled, the ADA, & Strict Scrutiny, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 393, 393 
(1994) (arguing that the ADA overturned Cleburne). But see Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of 
Law Exam'rs, 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1134 (S.D.N. Y. 1997) ("[AJt the very least, Boerne tells us that 
Congress may not, under the ADA, directly alter the level of scrutiny afforded the disabled under 
the Equal Protection Clause."), vacated in part, No. 97-9162, 1998 WL 611730 (2d Cir. Sept. 14, 
1998). 
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commerce.'>82 In addition, the ADA specifically abrogates the states' sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.83 
The protections of the ADA apply to every "qualified individual with 
a disability.,,84 A disability is defined as a "physical or mental impairmenf8S] 
that substantially limits186] one or more ... major life activities of [an] 
individual," including "functions such as caring for one's self, performing 
82. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1994). As noted above, however, courts have begun to 
question whether Title II is a valid exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment power. See supra 
notes 13-14 and accompanying text; Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932, 940 (E.D.N.C. 1996) 
("Unlike traditional anti-discrimination laws, the ADA demands entitlement in order to achieve its 
goals. This the Fourteenth Amendment cannot authorize."). 
83. The ADA includes a clause expressly abrogating states immunity. "A State shall not be 
immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in 
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 12202 
(1994). As a result, courts have had no difficulty recognizing that Congress met the requirement 
of "unmistakable" intent to abrogate immunity in the ADA. See Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 
1269-70 (9th Cir. 1997); Autio v. AFSCME, Local 3139, 968 F. Supp. 1366, 1368 (D. Minn. 
1997), afJ'd, 140 F. 3d 802 (8th Cir. 1998). 
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994). 
The term 'qualified individual with a disability' means an individual with a disability 
who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the 
removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of 
auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt 
of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity. 
Id. § 12131(2). 
85. Physical and mental impairments means: 
(A) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss 
affecting one or more of the following body systems: Neurological, musculoskeletal, 
special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, 
reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; 
(B) Any mental or psychological disorder such as mental retardation, organic brain 
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 
28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1998). 
86. Substantially limits means: 
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general 
population can perform; or 
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an 
individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, 
manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can 
perform that same major life activity. 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(1) (1998). 
The regulations also list a number off actors to consider in determining whether a major life 
activity is substantially limited: U(i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration 
or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the 
expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment." Id. § 1630.20)(2). 
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manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working."s7 The definition of "disability" also requires that individuals have "a 
record of ... an impairment'oIIS or are "regarded as having ... an impairment.,0119 
In addition, the ADA protects nondisabled people who associate with disabled 
people.90 
The ADA is divided into several titles and governs a broad range of 
activities, including employment,91 government services,92 and public 
accommodations.93 This Article focuses on Title II of the ADA, which prohibits 
discrimination and segregation by public entities.94 "Public entity" is broadly 
defined to include "any State or local government" and "any departinent, agency, 
special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local 
government. ,,9S 
Title II of the ADA expanded federal civil rights protection for the disabled 
by establishing that all state and local governmenf6 services ·be provided 
effectively, with necessary accommodations and aides, in integrated settings.97 
87. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1998). 
88. 42 U.S.C. § Ql02(2)(B) (1994). 
89. Id § 12102(2)(C). Individuals may be "regarded as" disabled in one of three ways: (I) 
having an impairment that does not substantially limit a major life activity but is treated as if it did; 
(2) having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity because of the attitudes of 
others; or (3) being treated as having an impairment where no such impairment exists. See 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1998). 
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (1994) (applying to employment); see also 28 C.F.R. § 
35. 130(g) (1998) (applying to public entities). 
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994). 
92. Id §§ 12131-12165. 
93. Id. §§ 12181-12189. Congress has also created a law to provide telecommunications 
services to individuals with speech or hearing impairments. 47 U.S.C. § 225 (1994). 
94. 42 U.S.c. §§ 12131-12165. For a thorough discussion of Title II, see RUTH COLKER & 
BONNIE P<.?ITRAS TuCKER, THE LAW OF DISABLING DISCRIMINATION, ch. 6 (2d ed. 1998); Anne B. 
Thomas, Beyond the Rehabilitation Act of J973: Title I1 of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
22 N.M. L. REv. 243 (1992). 
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (1994). 
96. "[T]itle II applies to anything a public entity does. . .. [C]overage, however, is not 
limited to 'Executive' agencies but includes activities of the legislative and judicial branches of 
State and local governments." 28 C.F.R. § 35, app. A at 446 (1998). Neither the statute nor its 
implementing regulations list specific state entities or agencies that are exempted from or included 
in Title II's coverage. In contrast, Title I, dealing with employment, contains explicit exceptions 
to its broad applicability including the federal government, Indian tribes, and tax-exempt private 
clubs. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(8) (1994). Likewise, Title III, dealing with accommodations, lists 
twelve categories of covered private entities. Jd. § 12181(7)(A)-(L). 
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-34 (1994). The relevant language in Title II states: "[N]o qualified 
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or 
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994). 
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In addition to prohibiting intentional discrimination, Title II requires public 
entities to operate their programs and services in a manner readily accessible to 
qualified individuals with a disability.98 Public entities must, like the private 
sector, provide reasonable accommodations to disabled individuals.99 Rather 
than using the generic term "reasonable accommodation," like Title I of the 
ADA, Title II expressly mandates the types of accommodations that must be 
provided. These include the reasonable modifications of rules, policies or 
practices, the removal of architectural, communication or transportation barriers, 
and the provision of auxiliary aids.1oo When faced with a claim of discrimination 
or failure to accommodate, state and local governments have available the same 
defenses as private entities. 101 
Title II states that the remedies available in any action against a state are the 
same as those available in an action under the ADA against any other entity .102 
98. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (1998). Title 11 uses the phrase "qualified individual with a 
disability" to refer to those who are covered by its provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2) (1994). The 
term "qualified individual with a disability" is defined as: 
Id. 
[A]n individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, 
policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation 
barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility 
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities 
provided by a public entity. 
99. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (1998). 
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994). 
IO\. Title 11 imposes its conditions on all public entities, regardless of size. Like private 
entities, however, public entities can be excused from some of the requirements if they can show 
that compliance would create an undue financial and administrative burden, see 28 C.F.R. § 
35. 150(a)(3) (1998) (applying to the modification of existing facilities); id. § 35.164 (applying to 
the procurement of communications devices); 49 C.F.R. § 37.151 (1998) (applying to paratransit 
services), cause a fundamental alteration in the service, see 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (1998) 
(applying to the modification of existing facilities); id. § 35.164 (applying to the procurement of 
communications devices), or destroy the historic significance of a building, see id. § 35.1 50(a)(2) 
(qualifying the requirement that public services be readily accessible to disabled individuals). 
In the employment context, public entities may avoid the requirements of Title II by 
demonstrating that providing an accommodation would impose an undue hardship. See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.15(d) (1998). "Undue hardship" means "significant difficulty or expense." See id. § 
1630.2(p)(I). To determine whether an accommodation imposes significant expense, courts must 
consider the cost of the accommodation and the employer's financial resources. See id. § 
1630. 15(p)(2). In addition, accommodations must be reasonable. See Vande Zande v. Wisconsin 
Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that to present a prima facie case of 
discrimination under the ADA for failure to provide an accommodation, an employee "must show 
that the accommodation is reasonable in the sense both of efficacious and of proportional to costs"). 
Also, while employers may have to consider the disabled individual's suggestions, see 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(0)(3) (1998), the final choice is left to the employer. See id. § 1630 app. at 363. 
102. "In any action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this chapter, remedies 
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Under Title II, plaintiffs with disabilities have successfully challenged laws and 
policies traditionally considered within the states' police power, including 
marriage regulations,103 quarantine rules,I04 social service policies and 
placements,105 zoning ordinances,l06 road construction and building 
modifications,107 jury selection criteria,108 and state bar licensing procedures. 109 
(including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent 
as such remedies are available for such a violation in an action against any public or private entity 
other than a State." 42 U.S.c. § 12202 (1994); see also Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990: An Overview, 22 N.M. L. REV. 13,63 & n.325 (1992) (describing Title 
II's enforcement scheme). Although courts have been willing to award various accommodations 
to disabled plaintiffs under Title II, see Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. 97-
9162, 1998 WL 611730 (2d. Cir. Sept. 14, 1998), the courts have not yet settled on whether and 
when damage awards should be available to plaintiffs, particularly in cases where the plaintiff has 
failed to show intentional discrimination. For a thorough discussion about the debate over the 
various types of relief available under Title II, see COlKER & TUCKER, supra note 94, at 547 
(discussing the availability of compensatory and punitive damages under Title II). 
103. See, e.g., T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. Supp. 110, III (D. Utah 1993) (invalidating state law 
that voided marriage by persons with AIDS). 
104. See Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F .3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that plaintiffs' 
suit stated a claim that Hawaii's quarantine law discriminated against blind individuals and 
remanding for discussion of whether the proposed modifications to the law were reasonable). 
105. See, e.g., Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 336-39 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that Title 
II requires state social service agency to implement reasonably integrated services for clients with 
disabilities); Weaver v. New Mexico Human Servs. Dep't, 945 P.2d 70 (N. Mex. 1997) (holding 
that a New Mexico Human Services regulation which imposed a 12-month maximum period of 
eligibility for disabled adults receiving benefits from the general assistance program violated Title 
II of the ADA). 
106. See, e.g., City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 738 (1995) (holding 
that federal statute prohibiting discrimination in housing based on disability should be interpreted 
to allow challenge to city zoning provision that limited the number of unrelated occupants allowed 
in a dwelling because the provision failed to accommodate reasonably a group home for recovering 
addicts). 
107. See Kinney v. Yerusalim, 9 F.3d 1067, 1075 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that Title 11 
required curb cuts installed when city undertook to make certain street paving and resurfacing 
repairs). 
108. See, e.g., Galloway v. Superior Court, 816 F. Supp. 12, 19-20 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding 
that blanket exclusion of blind people from jury pool violates the ADA); People v. Caldwell, 603 
N.Y.S.2d 713, 716 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1993) (holding that court had obligation under ADA to 
reasonably accommodate potential juror's visual impairment). The courts have also recognized that 
courthouses must be accessible to individuals with disabilities. See Kroll v. Saint Charles County, 
766 F. Supp. 744, 752-53 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 
109. See. e.g., Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1995) 
(holding that state bar application asking questions concerning mental, emotional or nervous 
disorders are impermissible under Title II); Ellen S. v. Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 859 F. Supp. 
1489, 1494-95 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that Tenth Amendment posed no independent bar to 
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III. DEBATING THE ADA'S ABROGATION OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
After the Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne decisions, the Eleventh 
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment questions in ADA cases thus are (1) 
whether Congress abrogated the Eleventh Amendment immunity with sufficient 
clarity; and (2) whether the ADA is a valid exercise of Congress' power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. IIO 
Section 502 of the ADA expressly abrogates Eleventh Amendment protection 
for violations of the ADA and makes both legal and equitable remedies available 
in federal court against a state ''to the same extent as such remedies are available 
for such a violation and an action against any public or private entities other than 
the state.,,11I Such language satisfies the first part of the Seminole Tribe test in 
ADA cases. I 12 
application of ADA to state regulation of attorneys); cf Medical Soc'y of N.J. v. Jacobs, No. Civ. 
A. 93-3670 (WGB), 1993 WL 413016, at ·7-8 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993) (holding that State Board of 
Medical Examiners' investigation of mental health history of medical license applicants violated 
Title II by placing additional burdens on applicants with disabilities). See also Catherine C. Cobb, 
Challenging a State Bar's Mental Health Inquiries Under the ADA, 32 Haus. L. REV. 1383 (J 996). 
110. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
111. 42 U .S.C. § 12202 (1994) ("A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment 
.... "). See also Autio v. AFSCME, Local 3139, 140 F. 3d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1998) (Congress 
clearly abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting ADA); Kimel v. State of Fla. 
Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (lIth Cir. 1998) (holding that the ADA includes a clear 
statement of intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity); Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 
1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1997) (Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the state's 
immunity under both ADA and Rehabilitation Act), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998); Nihiser 
v. Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (Congress plainly indicated 
intent to abrogate states' immunity under Eleventh Amendment to suit under ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act). For a discussion of the clear statement rule as applied to the ADA and state 
prisons, see Michael P. Lee, How Clear is "Clear?": A Lenient Interpretation of the Gregory v 
Ashcroft Clear Statement Rule, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 255 (1998); Laura E. Walvoord, A Critique of 
Torcasio v. Murray and the Use of the Clear Statement Rule to Interpret the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1183 (1996). It is also important to note that the statute provides 
that states are not immune from ADA claims brought in "Federal or State court." 42 U.S.C. § 
12202 (1994). See Weaver v. New Mexico Human Servs. Dep't, 945 P.2d 70 (N. Mex. 1997). 
Thus, even if an individual cannot use the ADA in federal courts, state courts must still hear the 
claim. 
112. In Pennsylvania Department afCorrections v. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. 1952 (1998), a 
unanimous Supreme Court held that the plain language of Title II covers state prisons and prisoners. 
The Court further held that the term "qualified individual with a disability" is not ambiguous when 
applied to state prisoners. Id. at 1955. The Court determined that the ADA language does not 
require voluntary participation in the programs or services of a public entity to be protected under 
Title II. Rather, the Court found that Congress intended Title II to govern all state entities that 
provide any type of services, whether voluntary or not, to members of the population. ld. 
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Under the City of Boerne decision, the second part of the Seminole Tribe 
analysis becomes less certain.113 It is unclear whether the ADA is a valid 
exercise of congressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. 114 
Congress enacted the ADA and declared that disabled individuals were a 
"discrete and insular minority;" the Supreme Court, however, did not reach the 
same conclusion in its earlier decision concerning discrimination against disabled 
individuals. 
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,lIs the Supreme Court 
addressed whether mental disability is a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. 116 
Cleburne involved a city zoning ordinance that required a special use permit to 
operate a group home for mentally retarded persons.J17 The plaintiffs challenged 
the city's denial of their request for a permit on equal protection grounds. liS 
Although the court held that mental disability is not a suspect classification, 1 19 
it found the denial of the permit violated the Fourteenth Amendment using a 
rational basis standard. 120 In Cleburne,12I the Court observed that no "continuing 
antipathy or prejudice" exists towards persons with mental disabilities, thereby 
obviating the need for a heightened level of scrutiny.122 In its analysis, the Court 
mentioned a series of groups that it also apparently believed did not trigger 
113. For a discussion of the continuing validity of the ADA after City of Boerne, see Jesse 
H. Choper, On the Difference in Importance Between Supreme Court Doctrine and Actual 
Consequences: A ReView of the Supreme Court's 1996-1997 Term, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 2259, 
2289-2302 (1998); Elizabeth Welter, Note, The ADA's Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment State 
Immunity as a Valid Exercise of Congress ' Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 82 MINN. 
L. REv. 1139 (1998); Note, Section Five and the Protection ofNonsuspect Classes After City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1542 (1998). 
114. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. See generally Daniel O. Conkle, 
Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores: The (Limited) Role of 
Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom From State and Local Infringement, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L.J. 633 (1998); Brent R. Hatcher, Jr., Casenote, City of Boerne v. Flores: Defining the 
Limits of Congress 'Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause Power, 49 MERCER L. REv. 565 
(1998). 
115. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
116. Id. at 435. 
117. Jd. at 436. 
118. Id. at 437. 
119. Id. at 442. 
120. Id. at 435. In his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Marshall 
argued that the majority reached this result using a higher level of scrutiny than it acknowledged. 
Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Later commentators have agreed 
with Justice Marshall's analysis. See TRIBE, supra note 41, § 16-3, at 1444; Galye Lynn Pettinga, 
Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 793-
96 (1987) (discussing the heightened level of scrutiny in Cleburne). 
121. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
122. Id. at 443. 
HeinOnline -- 32 Ind. L. Rev. 65 1998-1999
1998] WHOSE FEDERALISM? 65 
heightened scrutiny, including the physically disabled.123 As a result, courts and 
commentators have understood Cleburne to establish that disability in general is 
not a suspect classification. 124 The fact that the disabled appear to be a non-
suspect class under current Supreme Court precedent limits Congress' ability to 
legislate on their behalf. Based on City of Boerne, in order to protect a non-
suspect class, Congress must find facts that demonstrate the existence of 
invidious discrimination in a law which would otherwise withstand rational basis 
scrutiny. 125 
Because City of Boerne's narrow interpretation of Congress' Section 5 
authority leaves open the possibility that the ADA is not a valid exercise of 
Congress' power, and thus fails to abrogate state immunity, states have been 
quick to maintain that the ADA should not be applicable to them: 26 Based on 
City of Boerne, states have maintained that Congress' attempt to abrogate state 
immunity fails because the ADA applies heightened scrutiny to a non-suspect 
class and effectively punishes "rational" discrimination by public entities by 
requiring reasonable accommodations for the disabled.127 Several courts have 
123. Id. at 445-46 (rejecting eligibility for heightened scrutiny for groups such as "the aging, 
the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm"). 
124. See Hansen v. Rimel, 104 F.3d 189, 190 n.3 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Although protected by 
statutory enactments such as the [ADA], the disabled do not constitute a 'suspect class' for 
purposes of equal protection analysis."); Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adults v. Wingate, 101 
F.3d 818, 824-27 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying rational basis standard to claims of disabled individuals), 
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1843 (1997). See also Rains, supra note 52, at 199 (asserting that Cleburne 
"managed to weaken future equal protection claims asserted by, not only mentally retarded persons, 
but other individuals with disabilities"). 
125. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 St. Ct. 2157,2169-71 (1997). 
126. See Autio v. AFSCME, Local 3139, 140 F.3d 802, 805 (8th Cir. 1998) (describing the 
state's argument as emphasizing that disability is subject to the rational basis test and implying that 
the ADA illegitimately embodies a higher level of scrutiny than rational basis); Clark v. California, 
123 F.3d 1267, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting state's argument that Congress' power must be 
limited to the protection of those classes found by the Court to deserve heightened scrutiny under 
the Constitution), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998). But see Garrett v. Board of Trustees of the 
Univ. of Ala., 989 F. Supp. 1409, 1409-10 (N.D. Ala 1998) (arguing that City o/Boerne apparently 
"was not available to, was ignored by, or was misunderstood by those courts that have ruled in favor 
of applying the ADA ... to states"). 
127. See Garrell, 989 F. Supp. at 1410 (noting that Congress cannot require a state to grant 
preferential treatment under the ADA to its employees simply by purporting to invoke Section 5); 
Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, 987 F. Supp. 451, 460 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (finding 
that Congress improperly invoked Fourteenth Amendment to facilitate the ADA's putative 
abrogation of the sovereign immunity of the states; therefore Eleventh Amendment is a properly 
asserted defense for state in ADA action); Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 
1168, 1176 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (finding that insofar as accommodation is defined under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111 (9) (1994), ADA and Rehabilitation Act accommodation provisions are not a valid exercise 
of Congress' enforcement power under Fourteenth Amendment). 
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agreed with these arguments and have refused to abrogate sovereign immunity.128 
For example, in Brown v. North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles;29 the 
court decided that the ADA is a substantive rather than remedial exercise of 
Section 5,,30 Second the court focused on the ADA's reasonable accommodation 
requirement and determined that this rendered the ADA an improper exercise of 
Section 5131 because "the ADA does not remediate invidious, arbitrary, or 
irrationally made classifications.,,132 
Other courts have taken a different approach to the abrogation issue, 
upholding the ADA's abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity as a valid 
exercise of its Section 5 power. 133 In Autio v. AFSCME, Local 3139,134 the 
Eighth Circuit upheld jurisdiction under the ADA. 13s The court applied both the 
Morgan test,136 and City of Boerne's congruence and proportionality analysis, 
128. See Garrett, 989 F. Supp. at 1410 ("Congress cannot stretch Section 5 and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to force a state to provide allegedly equal 
treatment by guaranteeing special treatment or 'accommodation' for disabled persons."); Brown, 
987 F. Supp. at 458 (stating that "[t] he ADA ... single[s] out the disabled for special, 
advantageous treatment"); Nihiser, 979 F. Supp. at 1174 (asserting that "[t]he accommodation 
provisions will place a serious financial burden upon the states"). 
129. 987 F. Supp. 451 (E.D.N.C. 1997). 
130. Id. at 458 (noting that Congress cannot alter the Supreme Court's classification of 
disabled individuals as a non-suspect class). 
131. Id. The court said "the concept of entitlements has little to do with promoting the 'equal 
protection of the laws.'" Id. See also Nihiser, 979 F. Supp. at 1176 (holding that the ADA does 
riot abrogate sovereign immunity because the ADA's accommodation provisions amount to 
congressionally "created substantive rights"). 
132. Brown, 987 F. Supp. at 458. 
133. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
Congress effectively abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits under the ADA), 
vacated in part, 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998); Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety and Correctional 
Servs., 126 F.3d 589, 604 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh 
Amendment immunity of states under ADA); Annstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir. 
1997) (holding that exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity set forth in Ex Parte Young 
applies to allow ADA action against named individuals in their official capacities), cert. denied, 118 
S. Ct. 2340 (1998). One post-City of Boerne decision concerning whether the ADA effectively 
abrogated state immunity, upheld the ADA's validity against the state without ever applying the 
new congruence and proportionality standard. See Wallin V. Minnesota Dep't of Corrections, 974 
F. Supp. 1234 (D. Minn. 1997). 
134. 140 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 1998). 
135. Id. at 803. 
136. As mentioned above, in Morgan, the Court applied a three-part test: "We ... proceed 
to the consideration whether [section] 4(e) is 'appropriate legislation' to enforce the Equal 
Protection clause, ... whether it is 'plainly adopted to that end' and whether it is not prohibited by 
but is consistent with 'the letter and spirit of the constitution. ,,, Katzenbach V. Morgan, 384 U.S. 
641,651 (1966). 
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and found that the ADA constituted a valid exercise of Section 5. J37 Deferring 
to Congress' finding that the disabled are a "discrete and insular minority"138 that 
has been historically isolated and lacks legal redress for its treatment, the court 
found the remedial requirement of City of Boerne satisfied.139 The court further 
distinguished the ADA from RFRA on the basis that the purpose and structure 
of the ADA indicate that its primary goal is to eradicate the effects of intentional 
discrimination. 140 The Autio court then rejected the state's argument that 
Congress cannot act under Section 5 on behalf of non-suspect classes. It 
observed that many laws abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity have been 
upheld as constitutional where the protected rights were not grounded in a quasi-
suspect or suspect classification. 141 
Likewise, in Crawford v. Indiana Department of Corrections , 142 the Seventh 
Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Posner, held that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not block application of the ADA to state entities. 143 
Like other anti-discrimination statutes, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act is an exercise of Congress' power under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (as well as under the commerce clause, which is not 
excepted from the Eleventh Amendment) to enact legislation designed 
to enforce and bolster the substantive provisions of the amendment, in 
this case the equal protection clause. The Eleventh Amendment does not 
insulate the states from suits in federal court to enforce federal statutes 
137. Autio, 140 F.3d at 804-06. 
138. 42 U.S.C. § 12 101 (a)(7) (1994). 
139. Autio, 140 F.3d at 805 n.4. Likewise, other courts have also given the ADA's 
congressional findings great deference when upholding Congress' use of the Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement power as remedial in enacting the ADA. See Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 
136 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 1998). 
140. Autio, 140 F.3d at 804-05. Although Congress defined "discrimination" to include "the 
discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers," Congress' 
definition of discrimination also includes more traditional examples of purposeful conduct such as 
"outright intentional exclusion, ... overprotective rules and policies, ... [and] segregation." 42 
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5)(1994). 
141. Autio, 140 F.3d at 805. See also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 
U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (stating that method to correct invidious discrimination is not through 
creation of a new suspect class); Martin v. Kansas, 978 F. Supp. 992, 995 (D. Kan. 1997) 
("Congress, in enacting the ADA, has provided the direction absent in City of Cleburne, thus 
making distinctions between the judicial standards of review meaningless. "). The Martin court 
cited language from Cleburne that suggested that the judiciary has created a standard for reviewing 
disability-based classifications only in light of Congress' failure to do so through Section 5. ld. 
The Martin Court appeared to be arguing that now that Congress had made findings concerning the 
constitutional treatment the disabled had received by public entities, the courts were free to 
reconsider their earlier approach and adopt Congress' standard. See id. 
142. 115 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1997). 
143. ld. at 487. 
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enacted under the authority ofthe Fourteenth Amendment. . " Invidious 
discrimination by government agencies ... violates the equal protection 
clause even if the discrimination is not racial, though racial 
discrimination was the original focus of the clause. In creating a remedy 
against such discrimination, Congress was acting well within its powers 
under section 5.144 . 
The lower courts that considered City of Boerne are divided regarding how 
much deference they should give Congress' finding that a law constitutes 
arbitrary or invidious discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and whether Congress can abrogate sovereign immunity to remedy the identified 
violation. The courts that have relied on Congress' findings concerning the 
pervasive discrimination experienced by the disabled by not only private entities 
but public, have upheld the ADA as a valid exercise of Congress' Fourteenth 
Amendment authority. It remains unclear whether the Supreme Court will 
uphold such decisions. 
In general, discrimination experienced by disabled individuals has often been 
found to be non-intentional and thus not based on invidious discrimination. 145 
Public entities will be able to show that the rationale for failing to provide 
reasonable accommodations to the disabled resulted from economic realities, not 
hatred. 146 Such disparate impact discrimination may no longer be within 
Congress' power to remedy after City of Boerne.147 Thus, even though 
discrimination against the disabled may be unfair and in need of a global federal 
remedy, Congress may not be able to provide any relief against state 
discrimination. 
Congress is in the unique position to examine what is occurring in this 
country at a national level. Only Congress can identify systematic failures across 
the states and can act to address these problems by prohibiting discrimination 
against minorities, including non-suspect classes, by private and public entities. 
The enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and the other Civil War 
Amendments148 provided the federal government with greater authority over the 
states so that individuals would receive protection from various forms of 
discrimination. 149 Arguably, the Fourteenth Amendment does provide Congress 
144. Id. 
145. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (discussing the Rehabilitation Act and 
finding that the discrimination against the disabled resulted from thoughtlessness and indifference). 
146. See Concerned Parents to Save Dehrer Park Ctr. v. City of West Palm Beach, 846 F. 
Supp. 986, 992 (Fla 1994) (holding that although the city can make an economic determination that 
the disabled do not require any level of benefits, the ADA "does require that any benefits provided 
to non-disabled persons must be equally made available for disabled persons"). 
147. See _Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1976) (holding that the Equal 
Protection Clause reaches only intentional discrimination). 
148. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV. 
149. See NOWak, supra note 41, at 1209 ("If the civil War did anything, it changed the 
structure of our nation from one where political and economic power resided in certain localities 
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with the ability to establish a floor of protection for all citizens against irrational 
discrimination:so As a result of the recent federalism decisions, however, 
Congress' authority to deal with irrational discrimination against non-suspect 
classes has been put in doubt. Thus, the practical consequences of the new 
federalism undermine Professor Yoo's argument that this new federalism 
contributes to liberty .ISI 
Uncertainty now exists as to whether lower courts, and even the Supreme 
Court, will uphold laws that protect non-suspect classes, such as the disabled, as 
valid against state govemments.1S2 Nothing in the Supreme Court's recent 
to one truly unified nation."); John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes 
of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 
75 COLUM. L. REv. 1413 (1975) (stating that the history of the Eleventh Amendment 
"[e]stablish[es] the principle that Congress should be free to determine the extent of federal court 
jurisdiction over state governments, and this principle was reaffirmed by the ratification of the 
Fourteenth amendment."). Even the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment 
changed the balance of power between the state and federal government. City of Boerne v. Flores, 
117 S. Ct. 2157, 2165 (1997) (observing that the Fourteenth amendment '" limited but did not oust 
the jurisdiction of the State[s)''') (quoting CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., at App.151 (1971) 
(statement of Rep. Garfield). 
150. See Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court, i996 Term-Comment: Institutions 
and interpretations: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 171 (1997) 
(arguing that under Section 5, Congress should be viewed "as having some degree of authority to 
determine for itself what the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment mean, and to pass 
enforcement legislation pursuant to those determinations"). Permitting Congress to pass laws that 
establish a minimum level of protection does not undermine state autonomy and the ability of states 
to experiment and protect their citizens' liberty interests. States are still free to experiment above 
the level that congress has legislated. For instance, the ADA provides that states may not 
discriminate against the disabled and must make reasonable accommodations. Although states may 
no longer discriminate against the disabled, they may provide more protections than the federal law 
requires. Thus, states continue to serve as laboratories and protectors of liberty interests. 
151. See Edward L. Rubin, The Fundamentality and irrelevance of Federalism, 13 GA. ST. 
U. L. REv. 1009 (1997), stating: 
Federalism is a bit like abdominal surgery. It can save the political life of a nation 
under certain circumstances, but it is not benign and should not be resorted to 
without a reason. It can be divisive, exaggerating political differences that might 
otherwise have dissipated over time, and exacerbating conflicts that might 
otherwise have been resolved. Moreover, because it grants political sub-units 
definitive rights against the central government, it means that some residents of 
those sub-unties are likely to be treated in a way that the majority of the nation 
regards as wrong, and even immoral. 
152. Jesse Choper argues that: 
The ultimate question, not really addressed in City of Boerne, is whether the Court 
can be persuaded that "[m]any of the laws affected by the ... [ADA] have a 
significant likelihood of being unconstitutional" and, if so, whether the ADA's 
encompassing activities such as wheelchair access to prison recreational facilities 
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federalism cases prevents lower courts from finding that states are immune from 
the ADA in federal court. Indeed, the courts that have held that Congress lacks 
the authority to abrogate state immunity under the ADA appear to be applying 
the new federalism cases in a principled way.153 However, these lower court 
holdings are disturbing in that they are inconsistent with Congress' purpose in 
enacting legislation to remedy disability discrimination. They also do not seem 
consistent with a version of federalism that provides greater personal liberty to 
all citizens. 
CONCLUSION 
The' Court's new federalism does provide greater protection for state 
autonomy concerns. Although arguably the Supreme Court has an important role 
to play in these concerns, its federalism theory has undermined, not enhanced, 
individual liberties. Given the current Supreme Court jurisprudence, the ADA 
gives an individual access to the federal courts to challenge an exclusion from 
employment at Burger King and IBM, but not to challenge discrimination by 
state or local government entities. Surely this is not what Congress had in mind 
when it enacted the ADA because it found that state governments caused much 
of the discrimination against the disabled. The current new federalism permits 
lower courts to find state governments immune in federal suits against them 
under the ADA for their past or future misdeeds. 
Professor Y 00 uses historical arguments from the framers' era to demonstrate 
his theory that a strong form of federalism is mandated. It is easy to overlook the 
real world implications of that theory. Notwithstanding the cogent historical and 
theoretical arguments set forth by Professor Yoo, recent developments in 
disability law weaken the argument that the Court views increasing personal 
liberty for citizens as the basis for its new federalism. 
and a public school's policy regarding students with HIV satisfies the "congruence 
and proportionality" requirement in City 0/ Boerne. 
Choper, supra note 113, at 2301-02 (quoting City o/Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2170. 
153. See generally, Note, supra note 113, at 1554 (noting that the courts that have upheld 
abrogation under the ADA and the ADEA do not appear to do so on a principled, basis as they 
appear to be relying on the ratchet theory to justify their holdings). 
